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On Ontological Foundations
of Conceptual Modelling
Boris Wyssusek
Queensland University of Technology
b.wyssusek@qut.edu.au
Abstract. Failures in information systems development have frequently been
attributed to the application of insufficient or faulty information systems development methods. Some of these methods are concerned with the creation of
conceptual models, which are used for multiple purposes throughout the information systems development process. Criticism of conceptual modelling
methods usually targets their lacking of theoretical foundations. In response to
such criticism, various approaches towards theoretical foundations of conceptual modelling have been proposed. They can be differentiated by the reference disciplines they are drawing on. Though the relevance of the
philosophical discipline ontology for data modelling had already been recognised in the late 1950s, approaches that have been built on ontology are a
rather recent phenomenon. It was not before 1986 that Wand and Weber commenced working on an ontological foundation of conceptual modelling—drawing on the scientific ontology by Mario Bunge, thus later named Bunge-WandWeber (BWW) ontology. Twenty years after its inception, claims regarding the
validity of theoretical foundations of conceptual modelling based on the BWW
ontology have not been scrutinised yet. In an attempt to open up a debate, a
critical review of the BWW ontology and its application in the context of theoretical foundations of conceptual modelling is being offered.
Key words: conceptual modelling, ontology, Bunge-Wand-Weber ontology.
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1 Introduction
In developing information systems, conceptual modelling and conceptual
models are among the most fundamental means. Both the task of “conceptual
modelling” and its outcome, “conceptual models”, fulfill multiple purposes
throughout the entire information system development process (e.g., Kung and
Sølvberg 1986; Ashenhurst 1996). The importance attributed to conceptual
modelling and conceptual models has not only given rise to a wide range of
conceptual modelling methods, but also to the “yet another modelling
approach (YAMA)” syndrome (Oei et al. 1982) and the “not another modelling approach” (NAMA) hysteria (Siau 2003, p. 107). What drives both the
YAMA syndrome and the NAMA hysteria is the often observed impossibility
to prove the advantages claimed for yet another modelling approach, since it
may—like the approaches it aims to replace—be solely based on idiosyncratic
intuitions and experiences of its developers (e.g., Siau 2003, p. 108). Consequently, such approaches have been criticised for their lack of theoretical
foundations. Complementarily, the need for theoretical foundations of conceptual modelling methods in particular—and information systems development
methods in general—has been claimed (e.g., Wand and Weber 1990a; Weber
2003; Siau 2003).
One of the more recent responses to the quest for theoretical foundations of
conceptual modelling in information systems development is the reference to
the philosophical discipline ontology (or, metaphysics). Traditionally, ontology holds the promise of the most general knowledge—an insight that motivated McCarthy and Hayes (1969, p. 469) to call for “metaphysically adequate
modeling” of the world. Judged by the relative number of publications, the
currently most prominent of diverse approaches towards ontological foundations of conceptual modelling in information systems development appears to
be the so-called Bunge-Wand-Weber (BWW) ontology (e.g., Wand and Weber
1988). So far, claims made for the validity of the BWW ontology have not
been subjected to critical evaluation. The 20th anniversary of the BWW ontology motivates a careful reconsideration whether ontological approaches to
foundations of conceptual modelling are feasible and defensible. The following essay is an attempt to open up this debate. It is structured as follows: First,
we follow up the development of conceptual modelling and trace the quest for
its theoretical foundation. The currently strongest theoretical impact is being
attributed to ontological approaches, with the BWW ontology singled out.
Second, to investigate the transposition from a scientific ontology to an ontology for conceptual modelling, we present the salient assumptions underlying
Bunge’s ontology, which is the philosophical source of the Bunge-Wand64 • B. Wyssusek
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Weber ontology. Third, we recount the adaptation of Bunge’s ontology by
Wand and Weber, and conclude by questioning the overall project of ontological foundations of conceptual modelling.

2 The Roots of Conceptual Modelling and
the Quest for Its Theoretical Foundation
Methodical information systems development is a process consisting of successive phases, and a variety of conceptual modelling methods may be used
throughout the process. Even if nowadays conceptual modelling is generally
considered to be a most fundamental means in information systems development, the development of conceptual modelling only began around the year
1960 in a number of computing-related domains (e.g., Brodie et al. 1984; Hull
and King 1987; Mylopoulos 1998)
In artificial intelligence it was the need for knowledge representations that
eventually led to the development of conceptual modelling. Based on findings
from cognitive science, it has been assumed that the mind stores abstract
knowledge in so-called “concepts” and “conceptual structures” (e.g., Schank
1975). Conceptual modelling, understood as the modelling of concepts and
conceptual structures, would thus be the most natural way to represent conceptual knowledge. Yet the representation of the postulated concepts and conceptual structures requires its own abstract concepts. “Scripts” (Schank and
Abelson 1977), “frames” (Minsky 1975), and “semantic networks” (Quillian
1968) are such abstract concepts employed by conceptual modelling methods
for the purpose of knowledge representation.
In systems analysis the development of conceptual modelling was motivated by the need to represent an information processing problem independently from the implementation of an eventual solution (e.g., Young and Kent
1958). What does this mean? Obviously, before the development of conceptual modelling in (business-oriented) systems analysis, the description of an
information processing problem would have been a specification of an implementation of a solution to the problem. Even if such a specification is an
important intermediate goal within the information systems development
process, it should not be created during problem analysis, since a problem
analysis in terms of an implementation of a solution to the problem has some
severe disadvantages: First, only the currently technically feasible will be considered during analysis. Second, the focus on the determination of how functions should be implemented distracts from the determination of what
functions should be implemented. Third, already during problem analysis
B. Wyssusek • 65
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detailed knowledge of the implementation technology is required. Fourth, the
focus on implementation details hinders the communication with non-technical stakeholders such as users. Fifth, the evaluation of alternative implementations may be impossible due to the idiosyncratic character of their
descriptions. Since information systems are built to solve the users’ problems,
a description of an information processing problem should be prepared in
terms of the users’ domain. With other words, the information processing
problem of the users should be described with words (referring to concepts)
that are commonly used by the users when they conceptualise and talk about
the problem. Conceptual modelling methods eventually provided the means to
do so (e.g., Ross 1977).
Similarly, in database development the traditional focus on aspects of the
implementation of data models led not only to problems with respect to the
portability of data models, but also with respect to the communication
between users and developers. On the one hand, developers of databases had
to design databases in terms of some given database management system.
Without any layer of abstraction, the database description was highly specific
and bound to the respective database management system. The logic of the
database was merged with the logic of database management system, and
sometimes even with the physical structure of the data storage hardware. On
the other hand, data(base) descriptions in terms of database management systems rendered these descriptions meaningless to everyone not familiar with
the technical details of those systems. Thus, the development of conceptual
modelling in database development served at least two goals: (1) Enabling the
description of data and data structures at a level of abstraction that renders
them meaningful to system analysts and users. (2) Enabling database developers to specify databases independent from the technical details of a specific
database management system. This independency not only allows the portability of databases between different database management systems, but also
relieves the database developer from the need to know and understand the
technical details of database management systems, making the development
process more efficient. Conceptual modelling methods eventually provided
the means to develop models that would be abstract enough to be independent
from their technical implementation, and semantically rich enough to be comprehensible for the relevant parties involved (e.g., Chen 1976; Hull and King
1987).
The evolution of programming languages in particular and human-computer interaction in general seems to have followed a common path: moving
away from techno-centrism of machine languages (also in a transitive sense
covering user interfaces) towards anthropo-centrism of higher-level languages
(e.g., Feigenbaum 1996). In the early days of computing, information process66 • B. Wyssusek
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ing problems had to be stated in a language the vocabulary of which referred
to rather technical concepts belonging to the realm of the machine. With every
new generation of programming languages, the concepts referred to were
closer to the problem domains of the users. Domain-specific programming
languages are already very close to natural language, allowing the users to
state their problems in terms of the respective problem domain. Similarly, the
improvement of the graphical capabilities of computers made dramatic
changes in human-computer interaction possible. Powerful metaphors such as
“desktop”, “folder”, and “spreadsheet” allow users to interact with computers
by means of familiar concepts—without the traditionally required translation
from the language of the problem domain to the machine language ‘understood’ by the computer. Hence, “conceptual” and “concept” refer to the concepts that have to be used by users and developers when interacting with
computers. Nowadays, high-level programming languages and the design of
human-computer interaction refer to and make use of concepts that are rooted
in the domain of application, and not in the technical domain of computers.
Summing up, the development of conceptual modelling was driven by the
need to represent conceptual knowledge in a form that is (1) adequate to the
task at hand, (2) comprehensible for all parties involved in the development
and use of these representations, and (3) independent from the eventual technical realisation of the representation.
Criticism of conceptual modelling methods usually targets their lacking of
theoretical foundations (e.g., Siau and Rossi 1998; Weber 2003). Even if critics rarely explain why they believe a theoretical foundation would improve the
practice of conceptual modelling, or, what they mean by “theoretical foundations of conceptual modelling”, it appears that most critics implicitly or
explicitly question the justification for the semantics of the elements of the
respective conceptual modelling language (a.k.a. “modelling grammar”). For
example, Siau (2003, p. 108) laments: “Despite the importance of modeling
constructs, not much research has been done in this area. Most modeling constructs are introduced based on common sense, superficial observation, and
the intuition of researchers and practitioners.” Thus, the quest for theoretical
foundations of conceptual modelling is bound to a certain outlook on knowledge. It is driven by the belief that non-theoretical knowledge, i.e., knowledge
that does not meet the standard set by the scientific worldview (scientism)
(e.g., Bunge 1983b, pp. 258–271), is insufficient for good practice, or, for the
improvement of practice.
In response to the criticism, various approaches towards theoretical foundations of conceptual modelling have been proposed. The approaches can be
distinguished by the disciplines from which they received their inspiration and
borrowed their fundamental concepts and theories. Popular source disciplines
B. Wyssusek • 67
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are cognitive psychology and cognitive science (e.g., Siau 2003; Evermann
2005), semiotics (e.g., Stamper 1997), ontology (e.g., Wand and Weber 1988;
Guizzardi, Herre and Wagner 2002), and linguistics (e.g., Goldkuhl and
Lyytinen 1982).

3 The Ontology of Mario Bunge
Bunge’s main work on ontology is part of his eight volume “Treatise on Basic
Philosophy”, in which he sought to cover comprehensively and rigorously traditional fields of philosophical investigation, such as semantics (Bunge 1974b;
1974c), ontology (Bunge 1977; 1979), epistemology and methodology (Bunge
1983a; 1983b; 1983c; 1985), and ethics (Bunge 1989). Covering two volumes
of the treatise, it is impossible to give a detailed account of his ontology.
Rather, the following expands the principal assumptions of Bunge’s ontology
with a view on its epistemological implications, and its explicit concept of science and philosophy at large. This will help to demonstrate that these assumptions are not lofty speculations that can be safely cast aside in both theory and
practice of conceptual modelling. They determine the claims that are being
made for the validity and significance of ontological foundations of conceptual modelling. Consequently, these assumptions eventually also determine
how conceptual modelling is methodically organised and how it is performed.
Bunge is committed to dialectical materialism (Bunge 1977, p. 5), which is
an offspring of the materialism of the 19th century and a philosophical doctrine developed by Engels (1940), and later by Lenin (1927) (for an overview
see, e.g., Lichtheim 1973). Materialism explains the world as being constituted ultimately by matter. In our era, its ontological correlate is realism and
its epistemological is objectivism (or, scientific realism) (Bunge 1983b, pp.
264–267). Dialectics refers to the overall dynamics of matter, which is conceived of as akin to a debate in ancient Greece: antagonistic forces (thesis and
antithesis) are in contention, out of which emerges a higher force (synthesis)
that overcomes the contradictory state of the former. According to that, Bunge
claims that the real world, i.e., the material world, exists independent from our
knowledge (Bunge 1993, p. 229). His scientific worldview, i.e., scientism
(e.g., Bunge 1983b, pp. 258–271), also holds that objective human knowledge
is possible, since—as far as it is based on scientific methods—it represents the
real world (Bunge 1993, p. 233). Hence, truth is possible, but only by means
of science, as the scientific method is the only way to obtain truth (Bunge
1993, p. 231). From that follows that truth must find its expression in the languages of science, which are logic and mathematics (Bunge 1977, p. 7). State68 • B. Wyssusek
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ments, to be valid, need to be transformed into symbols ruled by logic. Thus
he claims: “Unless a construct is assigned a definite mathematical status […]
it is not exact and may be a fake, i.e. a flatus vocis rather than a genuine concept” (Bunge 1977, pp. 8–9). Bunge stresses the incompatibility of his concept
of science with other theories of cognition, such as empiricism and phenomenalism. He holds that science is non-phenomenological, i.e., science “attempts
to account for reality behind appearance” (Bunge 1979, p. 147), and that
although “phenomena […] are experientially immediate, […] they are neither
ontologically or scientifically primary” (Bunge 1979, p. 147).
The position of the human being within this worldview implies that there is
only one way left to come to fundamental statements about world. Materialism
means that “res cogitans is a res extensa” (Bunge 1979, p. 146). In other
words, since matter is all that is, and this is accessible to science directed
towards that matter, including the human being, all other attempts at knowledge are void, including so-called non-scientific philosophical knowledge.
From that follows the determination of ontology as “general science” and that
its task is to “stake out the main traits of the real world as known through science” (Bunge 1977, p. 5). Bunge thus emphasises: “[I]t is not true that ontology has become impossible after the birth of modern science. What has
become impossible de jure—though unfortunately not de facto—is nonscientific ontology” (Bunge 1977, p. 7). The historically primal domain of philosophy in this way becomes a secondary domain of scientific activity. In Bunge’s
terms, ontology is an a posteriori science (Bunge 1977, p. 8), and thus nothing
external to science. It draws together the diverse disciplines and their projections of world into a coherent whole: “A complete ontology should include
both universal and regional ontological theories. The former serve as frameworks for the latter, which will in turn illustrate and in a way test the former”
(Bunge 1977, p. 11).
The coherent whole is being constituted by means of formal logic. “Formal
science, or at least some of it, constitutes both the language and the formal
skeleton of scientific ontology. In particular, scientific ontology presupposes
abstract mathematics, including deductive logic” (Bunge 1977, p. 13). This
unifying view is ontological theory that “is a theory that contains and interrelates ontological categories, or generic concepts representing components or
features of the world” and that “is a [hypothetical deductive] system, not just a
set, of interrelated ontological categories” (Bunge 1977, p. 11). Bunge’s
largely formalised ontology, imbued with abstractions and formal logic, suggests its proximity to formal and semi-formal symbolic or conceptual modelling: “Theoretical science and ontology handle not concrete things but
concepts of such, in particular conceptual schemata sometimes called model
things” (Bunge 1977, p. 119).
B. Wyssusek • 69
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In sharp contrast to Bunge’s claims to a scientific ontology only obliged to
reason and logic is his rather disquieting polemic against any other conceptions of philosophy and science. For example, for Bunge, opposing philosophical schools must be based on irrational motives: Subjectivists are not able to
differentiate between a model and what the model is about, hence subjectivists
suffer from “a form of mental derangement” (Bunge 1977, p. 121). This
implies that any deviation from Bunge’s doctrine, especially from realism and
objectivism, is unworthy of any serious consideration; even more, anything
else cannot be simply erroneous, it can only be explained out of a person’s
mental insanity.

4 The Adaptation of Bunge’s Ontology by
Wand and Weber
In the year 1986 Weber spent a sabbatical at University of British Columbia,
where Wand held a position at the same time. Wand and Weber shared a common interest in some fundamental issues of information systems development.
Understanding an information system as “a human-created representation of a
real-world system as perceived by somebody”, and understanding the process
of information system development as “a transformation from human perceptions to an artifact representing these perceptions” (Wand and Weber 1990c, p.
125), they came up with the following fundamental question that would guide
their joint work for many years: “Given a user’s or a group’s conception of the
real world, under what conditions would an information system provide a
good or a poor representation of this conception?” (Weber 1997a, pp. xi, 73).
Weber explains further: “In short, the phenomena we concluded we might
seek to explain were (a) the conditions under which users of information systems would deem them to be ‘good’ representations of their conception of the
real world, and (b) the conditions under which users of information systems
would deem them to be ‘poor’ representations of their conception of the real
world” (Weber 1997a, p. 72). “Wand and I are simply trying to provide a way
of representing humans’ perceptions of their worlds. Whether these perceptions map to an independent reality or whether they manifest a social construction is neither here nor there” (Weber 1997a, p. 176). With other words, Wand
and Weber have been interested in the quality of the mapping between information system users’ conceptualisations of the real world and the representations of these conceptualisations in the information system. They have not
been interested in the quality of the mapping between the “real world” and the

70 • B. Wyssusek
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users’ conceptualisations of the “real world” (see also Wand and Wang 1996,
p. 88).
On the occasion of his sabbatical, it happened that Weber had an office
next to Mattessich, a renowned accounting researcher and philosopher of science (e.g., Mattessich 1978). Once, Weber asked Mattessich the following
question: “[W]hat were the set of generic constructs that people employ to
structure their conceptions of the world?” Mattessich handed Weber the Treatise by Bunge (Weber 1997a, p. 73)1. Subsequently Weber “discovered theoretical foundations that excited [Weber] in terms of their implications for
information systems. When [Weber] showed the contents of Volume 3 [i.e.,
Bunge 1977] to [Wand], [Wand] too concluded they had important implications for theory in the information systems discipline” (Weber 1997a, p. xi). In
various accounts Wand and Weber describe the appeal and their motivation for
their use of Bunge’s ontology as follows:
•

•

•
•

•

•

“We turned […] to Mario Bunge’s Ontology in order to obtain the formal foundation for modelling information systems” (Wand and Weber
1990c, p. 124).
Bunge’s “Ontology was used for three purposes: first, as a point of
view, and as a source of some fundamental propositions; second, as a
source for basic constructs to be applied to modelling information systems; and third, as a source of notation for the model” (Wand and
Weber 1990c, p. 146).
Bunge’s “Ontology was chosen because its objective is to describe the
structure of the real world” (Wand and Weber 1988, p. 214).
“Bunge’s ontology attracted us because many concepts he examines
are directly applicable to the information-systems and computer-science domains” (Wand and Weber 1990b, p. 63).
“We chose to employ, adapt and extend Bunge’s ontology for several
reasons. First, in our view his ontology is better developed and better
formalized than any we have encountered so far. […] Second, Bunge
models the world as a world of systems. Thus, he is concerned with
concepts that are fundamental to the computer science and information
system domains. […] Third, we believe we have been able to use
Bunge’s ontology to obtain useful theoretical and practical results”
(Wand and Weber 1993, pp. 220–221).
“We have chosen to work with Bunge’s ontology because it deals
directly with concepts relevant to the information systems and computer science domains (e.g. systems, subsystems and couplings). Moreover, Bunge’s ontology is better developed and better formalized than
any others we have encountered” (Wand and Weber 1995, p. 209).
B. Wyssusek • 71
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•

•

•

“I have chosen Bunge’s work to explicate the notion of a system for
two reasons. First, while I am not a philosopher, in my view it is the
best formulated and most complete theory of ontology that I have been
able to find […]. Bunge has strived to make his theory clear and exact
by articulating his constructs via mathematics. Second, Bunge (1977,
p. 24) [claims]: ‘Metaphysics can render service by analyzing fashionable but obscure notions such as those of system, hierarchy, structure,
event, information,....’” (Weber 1997a, p. 33).
“We chose [Bunge’s] work for several reasons. First, it is oriented
towards systems. Second, it is intended to deal with a wide range of
systems, from physical to social. Third, it is well formalized, both in
defining the concepts and outlining the premises and in providing a
consistent notation. Finally, it draws upon an extensive body of prior
work related to ontology” (Wand et al. 1995, p. 287).
“I have used Bunge’s theory because it articulates constructs and relationships that appear useful in the information systems and computer
science disciplines. For instance, Bunge’s theory is framed in terms of
constructs like thing, property of a thing, law, state, event, coupling,
system, and level structure. Moreover, I have yet to find an ontological
theory that matches Bunge’s in terms of clarity, precision, and formality” (Weber 2003, p. 3).

Summarising the above statements, it can be said that—after Mattessich
pointed them to Bunge’s work—Wand and Weber have been using Bunge’s
ontology because: (a) it uses a familiar terminology and deals with notions
such as “system,” “subsystem,” and “event,” which are most relevant to conceptual modelling in information systems; (b) it is to a large extent formalised;
(c) it comes with formalisms and notations that can be re-used; (d) it appears
to be a highly developed work in ontology; (e) its application has provided
Wand and Weber with valuable insights. Comparing the preceding section on
Bunge’s ontology with the paragraphs above, it becomes obvious that Wand
and Weber proceeded in a reductionistic fashion when they adapted Bunge’s
ontology.
First, Wand and Weber’s justification of their adaptation of Bunge’s ontology lacks the ontological commitment that makes Bunge’s ontology what it is:
a dialectical materialist, hence a realist ontology. The only reasonable justification for choosing such an ontology should read: “We have chosen Bunge’s
ontology because we believe in dialectical materialism”. Without such an
ontological commitment any reference to Bunge’s ontology is void. Wand and
Weber’s adaptation of Bunge’s ontology as an essentially formal theory, i.e., a
theory relating concepts that do not have a “factual reference”, (e.g., Bunge
72 • B. Wyssusek
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1974b, pp. 37–42)), hence not as a formalised ontological theory in the sense
of Bunge, contributed substantially to their ability to use Bunge’s ontology for
the ontological foundation of conceptual modelling. Having freed the ontological theory from its ontological commitment, Wand and Weber adapted,
among others, the following ontological constructs: “system”, “subsystem”,
“thing”, “property”, “law”, and “state” (e.g., Weber 1997a, pp. 33–54). Yet
without ontological commitment, those constructs are no longer ontological.
Second, focusing on familiar terminology and formalisation, Wand and
Weber transferred the formalisms, i.e., mostly logic and set theory, as well as
the respective terminology from the domain of scientific ontology to the
domain of conceptual modelling. However, terminology and formalisms are
only accidental to ontology, meaning that a particular ontology can be
expressed using different terminologies and formalisms: “[A] mathematical
formalism is by itself neutral with respect to matters of fact. So, unless the formalism is ‘read’ in factual terms, it will ‘say’ nothing about reality. […] [T]he
mathematical formalism becomes a factual theory, or rather one of a number
of possible factual theories with the same underlying formalism, if the suitable
factual interpretation is supplied” (Bunge 1974b, pp. 104–105). Thus, without
ontological commitment, the borrowing of constructs, formalisms, and terminology boils down to using Bunge’s ontology as a language (Bunge 1974b, pp.
18–19).
Third, Wand and Weber apparently understood (Bunge’s) ontology in
terms of conceptual modelling: “As Wand and I read Bunge’s work, however,
we realized that a number of researchers within the information systems and
computer science fields unknowingly had been working on ontological questions. These researchers had been working in the area that is usually called
‘conceptual modeling’ or ‘semantic data modeling’ (see, e.g., Hull and King
1987). Like the ontological researchers in philosophy, they, too, were concerned with how humans structure their conceptions of the world” (Weber
1997a, p. 73)2. The latter claim is obviously at variance with (not only)
Bunge’s understanding of ontology, since ontology is not “concerned with
how humans structure their conceptions of the world”. Rather, ontology is
concerned with “concrete objects” (Bunge 1977, p. 6). Concepts, however, are
not concrete objects. They “are fictions […]. Hence they are not part of the
real world even when they take part in our representations of the latter”
(Bunge 1977, p. 118). “The investigation of the patterns of representation […]
belongs to psychology, epistemology and methodology” (Bunge 1974b, p.
104) – but, for obvious reasons, not to ontology.
Fourth, on the one hand, Wand and Weber were obviously very impressed
by Bunge’s work. On the other hand, they not only ignored the larger part of it,
but also the, for conceptual modelling, most relevant parts. For example,
B. Wyssusek • 73

Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2006

11

SJIS 18(1).book Page 74 Friday, October 6, 2006 9:24 AM

Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 18 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 9

Bunge devoted an entire chapter to conceptual representation and issues of
conceptual modelling (Bunge 1974b, pp. 83–114). Bunge (1983a, pp. 129–
198) also addressed comprehensively matters of “perceiving” and “conceiving”.

5 Conclusion
The preceding discussion, even when limited in scope, has demonstrated that
the project of developing theoretical foundations of conceptual modelling on
the basis of philosophical ontology is neither feasible nor defensible. Yet, this
conclusion does not mean that Wand and Weber’s work has been erroneous.
Rather the project of ontology-based conceptual modelling appears to be
impossible in principle. As Bunge made clear, ontology is a response to ontological questions. However, questions regarding our conceptualisations are not
ontological question. Conclusively, Wand and Weber, being concerned with
theoretical foundations of conceptual modelling, asked the right question. But
they failed to recognise that ontology is not and cannot be the answer. This has
not only gone apparently unnoticed up until now, but rather ontology-based
modelling is an expanding area of theoretical research and publication within
the domain of systems analysis and design. Following Klein and Lyytinen
(1985), this may be attributed to one of the traits of scientism, namely its inability to reflect on its own presuppositions and limitations – as exhibited most
clearly by the following quote: “[W]e can clearly debate [the] relative merits
[of alternative ontologies] at a philosophical level, but I suspect it will be more
productive if we focus instead on how well they inform conceptual modelling
practice and the design of conceptual modelling grammars” (Weber 2003, p.
15). With the lack of critical reflection combined with the institutional bias
and dominance of scientism, dysfunctional discourses are bound to prosper.
The empirical analysis of how Wand and Weber’s foundational work became
adopted and diffused—despite its fundamental misconceptions—remains a
task to be addressed in a separate publication.

Notes
1.

Accounts of this event vary. According to one account, Mattessich handed the
entire Treatise: “During a discussion with [Mattessich] one day about my
research interests, he suggested I read Mario Bunge’s work. I gulped when he
handed me the [then] seven volumes of Bunge’s Treatise on Basic Philosophy.
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2.

I made a start, however, and in Volume 3 of the Treatise I discovered
theoretical foundations that excited me in terms of their implications for
information systems” (Weber 1997a, p. xi). According to another account,
Mattessich provided Weber with just the two volumes on ontology (i.e.,
Bunge 1977; 1979) (Weber 1997a, p. 73). Nevertheless, whenever Wand and /
or Weber explain why they have “selected” or “chosen” Bunge’s ontology one
has to be careful with the interpretation of these terms: First, according to the
accounts provided by Wand and Weber, they did not actively look for an
ontological theory, since they had no idea that such a theory might be relevant
for their work. Second, they never published a comparison of different
ontologies. References to other ontologies are made only superficially, i.e.,
Wand and Weber do not refer to a particular alternative ontological theory.
Given this evidence one might conclude that a selection – in the literal
meaning of the word – did not take place.
Wand and Weber do not provide convincing examples of these “ontological
questions”. Especially when we look at the following sample of ontological
questions provided by Bunge (1977, p. 1), it is difficult to imagine what
ontological questions the conceptual modelers are concerned with:
“Ontological (or metaphysical) views are answers to ontological questions.
And ontological (or metaphysical) questions are questions with an extremely
wide scope, such as ‘Is the world material or ideal – or perhaps neutral?’, ‘Is
there radical novelty, and if so how does it come about?’, ‘Is there objective
chance or just an appearance of such due to human ignorance?’, ‘How is the
mental related to the physical?’, ‘Is a community anything but the set of its
members?’, and ‘Are there laws of history?’”
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